Another off-topic post. This time about the emergency procedures followed by the UK Government. Over the last few days the media have been talking about the Cobra committee, chaired by both David Cameron and Nick Clegg to discuss the situation in Libya.
I have an interest and some experience in emergency planning. So this is a chance to talk about the 'committee' - its benefits but also some of the risks.
A few years ago I was involved in the civil contingencies process, advising on public communication during emergencies. Of course I was a small cog in a really big machine, but it was fascinating to see how the machine worked.
I also know that is of interest to others. The Cobra committee receives attention at some of the the most critical periods - an international incident, a flu pandemic, extreme weather incidents and fuel strikes.
4 things about COBR. It is:
- a complex of rooms - not a committee - which has continued to develop over the years
- a process that brings together all the decision-makers in one place and allows for a response that is truly cross-government
- the place where all the 'action is' - and so something that can pull people away from their teams
- a time consuming process - with some people spending their day going from meeting to meeting
A mix of benefits and risks. For more of discussion then read on.
It is probably useful to say that politicians, and the media, often play up the mystique of the COBR structure. It plays into the modern public perception created by TV programmes like Spooks. However the UK is very transparent about the processes used in an emergency. Much of the information is available online. So none of this is restricted information or breaking any confidences.
There are equivalent systems in the devolved administrations, including the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) in Edinburgh. In order to work together effectively they operate similar processes, but with the option to tweak them slightly to meet the local circumstances.
But first it is useful to make a couple of corrections on the use of phrase.
1) - First it is COBR not COBRA, and it stands for the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms. There is a story about it being Briefing Room ‘A’, so providing the A that makes it sound a little more deadly. However there are now a number of rooms used in any operation. It is now properly termed COBR, but the media continue to talk about Cobra and of course it is pronounced Cobra.
2) - Secondly, the acronym started as a description of the rooms and is now about a process. Technically there is no COBR committee, but there are a couple of different committees termed as such – in particular the Strategy Group and the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC). The Strategy Group tends to lead in international or terrorist incidents, and the CCC deals with other emergencies.
This is not about being a pedant, because these two points are quite important. They point to some of the positives of the system, and some of the risks.
There are also links into the other rooms around London and the UK, so that others can be part of COBR. For example Scottish Ministers will engage with the UK Ministers. The levels of discussion dependent on whether the area of policy is devolved or reserved to the UK Parliament. So in a policy area like health, for example during a pandemic, there could be four Health Ministers engaging on an equal basis to develop a joint approach. In another area such as terrorism, the key decisions might be taken by the UK Government - with complexities about who deals with the consequences (justice and community relations all being devolved).
The first points towards the growth of the facility. Over time the complex has become more complicated, and better designed for purpose with every incident. The technology allows for the flow of so much more information into the decision-makers. The way in which the information is gathered, analysed and the passed on to the groups has improved. The standardisation of the approach allows for better decisions to be made, when the stakes really are at the their highest.
The facilities are also a little more comfortable than they were originally, and better suited for 'events' that might last for weeks. COBR seems to open up on a relatively regular basis, and I wonder whether the gadgets and the nice coffee are the real attractions.
On a more serious note, the opening up of COBR is an 'action' that can be taken by a politician. At a time when information may be in short supply, when the options are not obvious, the opening up of COBR can be seen as a decisive move. Something to announce to the media to show that you are getting a grip on the situation.
But there is a threat in those developments. The COBR complex is all about communication and co-ordination, but most of the work is carried out elsewhere.
It is in the Ministries and Departments and emergency services that the real analysis and policy work is carried out. Any major incident will involve hundreds of people in offices around the UK. But the Ministers and senior officials may not want to leave the centre, particularly if they perceive all the action to be in COBR.
COBR, and the equivalent rooms in the other nations, can become extremely busy places. Having access can be seen as a badge of importance.
But the leaders risk losing contact with their teams, or with their own co-ordination centres. They may even seek to move more of their operations to COBR. But that goes against good practice in terms of emergency management. Do not try to learn new skills, or introduce new working methods, when you are at your most pressured. And we will return to that disconnection.
It is in the Ministries and Departments and emergency services that the real analysis and policy work is carried out. Any major incident will involve hundreds of people in offices around the UK. But the Ministers and senior officials may not want to leave the centre, particularly if they perceive all the action to be in COBR.
COBR, and the equivalent rooms in the other nations, can become extremely busy places. Having access can be seen as a badge of importance.
But the leaders risk losing contact with their teams, or with their own co-ordination centres. They may even seek to move more of their operations to COBR. But that goes against good practice in terms of emergency management. Do not try to learn new skills, or introduce new working methods, when you are at your most pressured. And we will return to that disconnection.
Second point is that this is about the development of a process. The benefit of the COBR structure is that you have true co-ordination of all of the Government departments. The Prime Minister will tend to chair the Strategy Group, and the decisions are binding on all. There will be a Lead Government Department, but the discussion is collective.
It is also a series of meetings that feed into each other. The specialists, including the communication advisors, meet as a team. They in turn will take part in a meeting of officials, often brought together from across all of the key Government departments.
That allows an informed briefing to be placed before the politicians (Strategy Group) or the Civil Contingencies Committee. All of the information flows to the decision makers, and it should also ensure that that only the most important issues needing decision reach the "Cobra" (sic) committee.
But the process can be hard going. The senior specialist, say the key communication advisor, can find themselves going from one meeting to each other – team meeting 9am with a scan of the media and decision about the line to take, specialist meeting 10am with other communication professionals, the officials meeting at 11am and then Strategy Group at noon. He or she then gets to chat with his team again at 1pm, and the process starts again.
If you are a communication practitioner then you will know how hard it will be to follow the public communication process when you are tied into the meetings. The speed of the media, and in particular the role of the social media in emergencies, makes the task harder than ever. There is a risk that the lead communicator falls behind, and by their third consecutive meeting the information is out-of-date.
If an event happens in a devolved area then there is another set of officials based in Edinburgh, Cardiff or Belfast. They often have an even longer day, because they have their own set of meetings that in turn lead to the UK meetings. In order to improve the connections between the various teams, a number of Liaison Officers are dispatched to the relevant regions and nations.
In his book The Terrorist Hunters, Andy Hayman said that he thought that COBR was overly political and “drags people away from the serious job in hand to attend a crisis meeting.” He suggests that the complex becomes the focus, and also that the process is very very time consuming.
He may well have a point, and we need to balance that against the advantages of the joint process that allows for cross-government decision making.
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